For those that did not understand at the right time the geopolitical stakes of the Presidential elections, February 4 offered another chance to figure out what camp each of the primadonnas of Romanian politics serves. The American President’s invitation for our country to take part in the missile shield, the prompt acceptance given by the Supreme Defence Council as well as the series of internal and external political statements that followed tell us exactly what is the great gain of the December 2009 elections, but mostly what would have been in store for us if their result would have been the opposite.

Although they are no longer in conflict as they were back in the days of the Cold War, Russia on the one hand and the United States, NATO and the EU on the other hand have their own interests in this region. Most of them are divergent, which makes Romania one of the battlefields where the two spheres of influence collide.

However, the way in which the two forces promote their interests differs radically. While NATO and the EU have at their disposal all the official channels so that the common policies become Romania’s policies too, Russia can only stake on subterranean influences that nevertheless can be extraordinarily efficient in sabotaging the partnership between our country and the military alliance and the union it is a member of.

For any rational man, Romania’s participation in the missile shield can only be beneficial. The partnership with the US offers an added military protection that does not entail any risk beyond those already assumed by acceding to NATO, by deploying forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, by contributing to the fight against terrorism. These commitments have put us long ago on the black list of those that see the free world as an enemy, with the missile shield providing a welcome protection against them. Subsequently, there is no argument for a good-willed politician to oppose such a project.

But despite all that, Ion Iliescu, former President and still one of the most influential politicians, is against this project and suggests that a referendum should be organized in order to validate the approval that the Supreme Defence Council has already given. Since the sentiments of most of the Romanians towards the United States are well known and all opinion polls conducted in the last 15 years show we are one of the countries in which America enjoys the most solid support, is there a real chance for that approval to fail in the referendum? Obviously not. And Ion Iliescu knows that very well. But for him it would be a great victory to succeed in delaying the American initiative or at least to put this partnership under a question mark on the public agenda. Just as he was content with showing Traian Basescu that he can orchestrate his suspension if he wants to, despite being certain that the subsequent referendum would have reinstated him in office by a crushing majority.

There is a striking parallel between the actions of Ion Iliescu, who was taught in Moscow during his youth, and Russia’s stance. The Kremlin knows it does not have a veto over America’s or NATO’s initiatives, yet the tone of its bellicose statements rises to pre-perestroika levels each time those initiatives take place in neighbouring countries. What is it based on? On the other leverages, the unofficial ones, that it has in order to obstruct the Western initiatives. And statements such as those of Iliescu, meant to question the consistency of the Romanian policy towards its allies, fit like a glove. Look carefully and you will discover that each of Russia’s reactions ‘of concern’ is echoed just as ‘concernedly’ in Bucharest. The moment Russia is concerned a Romanian politician or journalist is concerned too. Coincidences that signal the influence that Moscow still has in Romania and the card that it skilfully plays so that nothing that goes on here is done without taking its opinion into consideration.

Ion Iliescu is not alone. Last year he stood behind Mircea Geoana in the Presidential race. Today he backs Nastase in the race for the PSD presidency. Surprisingly, both Geoana and Nastase promptly and unequivocally expressed themselves in favor of the missile shield. Would they have done the same if they had been the ones in power? Would they have had the fortitude to quickly approve the American offer within the Supreme Defence Council if Iliescu had said ‘niet?’ The answer was given to us by Mircea Geoana himself. Several hours after welcoming the Supreme Defence Council’s approval, the person that was a step away from becoming Romanian President ‘nuanced’ his stance during an interview on Antena 3, synchronizing it with Ion Iliescu’s stance: ‘Such decisions cannot be taken hastily, we have to know what are our advantages, our costs. (...) Nothing is free. There are risks too. They could launch from Iran, they could hit us too.’

I wonder what would have been left of our partnership with the US and NATO if on the day in which Romania received the proposal to take part in the missile shield Mircea Geoana, as President and head of the Supreme Defence Council, had given the answer quoted above? Is there any doubt on what the PSD leader (for the time being) would have decided had he been the one to choose between not upsetting our allies and not upsetting the Russians?