A few years ago, a column signed by US expert Robert Kagan (later developed into a book) compared Europe to Venus and the US with Mars, sparking fierce debate on both sides of the Atlantic. The reputed politologist no more, no less than cast a doubt over the capacity of Europe - whose impressive soft power served it in the past to deal with the most diverse challenges - to face the threats of the 21st Century without decisively resorting to hard power. But the newspaper story outreached far beyond this, as it appeared in the wake of the Iraq invasion by the forces of the international coalition organized by the US. The idea was that America will be unable to deal with the threats of the 21st Century on its own, so Europe should change its behaviour philosophy in the international arena, as global security threats will be so serious and on such a huge and unforeseeable scale that hard power will be the only alternative. At that time, the column was also understood as a sign of the deteriorating transatlantic relationship, and of the widening gap between how Europe and America understand today’s world.

It is nonetheless true Europe is aware that, in order to prove it is a major international actor, it needs to develop the EU’s military component, so that it has the hard power, when it will need it. While undergoing this major effort, the EU conducted peace support operations (PSO) in Europe (Kosovo and FYROM), Africa (Cote d’Ivoire etc.) and Afghanistan. But such missions were seldom organized as a joint effort (except for FYROM and Kosovo) and rather relied upon the individual contribution of each state. In Afghanistan, for instance, the EU countries have sent impressive forces - over 50,000 troops - but as national contingents.

The matter is not purely academic and has essential aspects pending to international security. Is Europe prepared to use its impressive hard power (about 2 million troops, including 110,000 ready to be deployed in theatres of war at instant’s notice) to contribute to international security? To what extent does such a possibility strengthen the north-Atlantic alliance, or - on the contrary - does its absence weaken it?

Recently, on February 23, Washington’s National Defence University hosted a seminar, in presence of NATO high officials, dedicated to the new Strategic Concept of NATO and equally to the role held by the alliance in today’s world. On this occasion, the US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates stressed in an address that the essential change for NATO in the post- Cold War era was “the transition from a static, defence force to an expeditionary force - from a defensive alliance to a security alliance.” This transition is the result of fundamental changes in the global security climate, with the source of threats switching from classic aggressions to the consequences of the collapse of weak or bankrupt states, or the actions of non-state entities within such states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or the trans-national character of non-conventional threats (organized crime, drug and human trafficking etc.). But most important in Gates’ speech was the reference to the military capacity of Europe and the will of the EU to use them. Gates evoked the “pacifying” of Europe in the 20th Century, after centuries of ravaging wars, but he also warned that the continent has reached an “inflection point” where he goes too far in the opposite direction. He stated it openly: “The demilitarization of Europe - where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it - has gone from a blessing in the 20th Century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st. Not only can real or perceived weakness be a temptation to miscalculation and aggression, but, on a more basic level, the resulting funding and capability shortfalls make it difficult to operate a fight together to confront shared threats.” In this context, Gates explained that only 5 of the 27 NATO member states favour the idea of allotting over 2 pc of their GDP to the military. The same mentality is responsible for the alliance being unable to build up the capabilities necessary for the ongoing missions, in due time (the helicopter force being such an example).

Or, such a situation has impact upon the current NATO mission in Afghanistan, Gates concluded. To say nothing about the fact that, deprived of the upgrades necessary in the post- Cold War era, the militaries of most NATO states can only conduct missions at home (about 70 pc of these forces). Meanwhile, according to talks conducted so far, an essential element in NATO’s new Strategic Concept will be to implement Article 5, which provides for supporting an ally, if needed. Such a mission can be covered through contingency plans or intelligently deployed forces (the missile shield, for instance), but also by dispatching support forces - something that must be prepared in a timely manner. In order to achieve this, NATO members need investments and political will, above all.

There is also another problem that should be considered by European decision makers. This relates to the presence of hotbeds for aggression near the continent, which must be dealt with both soft and hard power. As the US focuses its attention mainly on other regions of the planet, dealing with such crisis regions in the Near and Far East, Africa and the eastern Black Sea falls upon Europe. To be ready for such missions, the EU must build the necessary hard power and the need for using it, for the sake of a sound alliance.

Such an episode could look bad for the strength of transatlantic relations, like an expression of controversies between the two sides of the alliance, especially in the context of Holland withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan. However, we would rather see it as reassessing the priorities and the burden sharing between the two entities of the alliance, as the US is firmly headed towards Asia and Europe is left with the operations in its close vicinity. Our assumption also finds support in the open letter made public, these days, by German defence officials (including Volker Ruhe and Klaus Nauman) who plead in favour of bringing Russia into NATO and denuclearizing Europe. But we will analyze the significance of this recent European opinion in another article.