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May 9, 2021

Unknown world of tomorrow

International Media, especially the American and European one, experience a real frenzy by accounting the international policy files in which the elected US President, Donald Trump, promotes the change of the political orientation, once he will be established at the White House. If we refer either to the agreement with Russia, or to the new policy towards China, or the attitude towards NATO, or related to Israel’s Capital (the transfer from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem is expected), Trump is credited with a new foreign policy designed to change the face of the current global order and to lead the world to another paradigm of evolution. And now, we don’t know at all if it’s better than the one on which it is set now, or if it precedes a world of conflict between the nuclear powers of the world.

Let’s take China, for instance. There’s nothing more annoying for Beijing that the doubt on the existence of “one China”, namely the non-recognition of the secessionist province of Taiwan as anything else but a part of the territorial Chinese heritage designed to be reunified sooner or later.

Therefore, one China, an integrant part of the Chinese identity, as well as a red line of the Beijing policy and of the national mentality. As we know, a real systemic “game change” was represented by the opening of the US President R. Nixon to China in 1972, based exactly on the recognition of this principle. Translated into the accession of the People’s Republic of China in the UN Security Council, on the place occupied by Taiwan (Chine Republic) until then, this surprising “move” of Washington allowed a geopolitical partnership between US and China, which undoubtedly led to an earlier end of the Cold War, and therefore, to the optimization of the global order after the Cold War.

Since almost 50 years, this orientation of Washington in the international policy became a benchmark of the predictable and peaceful systemic development of the great nuclear powers. But Donald Trump made this orientation to be questionable not only by accepting the phone call from the Taiwan leader, but also by continuing to persevere into this adopted position, obviously rising Beijing’s annoyance. In a post on its Twitter account, the Swedish diplomat Carl Bildt wrote on December 12, this year: “Donald Trump statement questioning One China policy indicates that literally everything is up in the air and subject to new deals.” In an editorial published on December 12, 2016 by the officious newspaper “Global Times” from Beijing, it is written as a reply to the Trump assertions: “The next question is, if Trump abandon the ‘one China’ principle, what is the need for China to do most of the international affairs of the United States partners? If the United States openly supports ‘Taiwan independence’ and more unbridled arms sales to Taiwan, what is the need for Beijing to boycott and cut all kinds of forces hostile to the United States? Why cannot we openly support them, or give them weapons in secret?” So US is warned about an answer of the same kind to such a change of orientation, which is a certain recipe of confrontation. William Stanton, an experienced American diplomat, assessed Trump’s recent positioning in this case as follows: “Either he doesn’t know what he is talking about, or he is endangering the status that Taiwan has always had in U.S. policy/…/Having done a good thing, from my point of view, Trump has undone it”. China is not the only case dealing the new approaches belonging to Trump. Gideon Rachman, in his editorial published in “The Financial Times” (on December 12) indicated other cases also, in the summary posted on Twitter by the author himself: “column looks at whether Trump will endorse Le Pen, bomb Iran, and form an axis with Russia v China”. Regarding Iran’s bombing – we know that the elected US President is an opponent of the nuclear agreement with Teheran, concluded on July, 2015 – Rachman appreciates that Trump could assume such a decision.

The analyst believes that abandoning this agreement, Trump will open the path to a military action against Iran, since some of the counselors surrounding him even wish such a development. The only reserve assumed by the analyst is that he doubts that Trump has the “appetite” for another war in Mideast, being known that in 2003 he was an opponent of the invasion in Iraq. The Twitter correspondents of the analyst representing the famous British newspaper express their own “guess” to the approached issue in a very direct an unequivocal style. For instance, a correspondent appreciates that “no, no, yes”, more broadly, stating that Trump will not support Marie Le Pen in the French presidential elections, he will not bomb Iran, but he will try to make an alliance with Russia against China.

The relationship with Russia of the future US President rises several comments. Ian Bremmer wrote on his Twitter account that this relationship will have a positive development: “Under Trump, US-Russia relationship set to shift from worst since Andropov to best since World War II.” The same expert noted on December 12, continuing his previous assessment, that “Putin probably ramps back military muscle flexing in Europe once Trump takes office. China muscle flexing in Asia replaces it”. Therefore, in the quoted expert’s understanding, this would anticipate a diminishing of the Russian activism to the Eastern border of NATO in Europe, Russia becoming assertive towards the Asian side. Related to the same chapter of the relationship with Russia, the quantity of analyses focused in the last days on the importance of the elected President D. Trump as the head of the American diplomacy.

It’s about Rex Tillerson, the CEO of the American petroleum giant Exxon, a close to the political and business environment in Russia. This nomination was assessed in Russia as “100% good news” for President Putin, and also “a clear sign that US foreign policy will move from principles, values and strategic partnerships towards a more transactional approach”. Tillerson is known not only as a close person to President Putin and to the influent Igor Sechin, the Rosneft boss, the second man in power in Russia, but also the one who managed to obtain an important share for Exxon in the exploitation of the fabulous deposits of hydrocarbon in the Arctic Russia. For some of the analysts, this nomination at the leadership of the State Department is the signal of an imminent positive dynamics in the relationship between US and Russia.

The above briefly mentioned issues, as well as highlighting some “guesses” belonging to known experts of the international relations, draw an uncertain and alarming immediate future. On the one hand, we are near a short-term future full of unknown elements, being well known that this perspective cannot be accurately deciphered, regardless of the means we have, which is normal. But on the other hand, the multitude of changes in the fundamental orientations on the international level, announced by the one who will lead the most important state of the planet, are essentially different by the ones that became traditional until now, and this is an alarming thing.

This is the case of the relationship between US and China, as well as of the relationships between US and Russia or Iran, where real changes of paradigm in the orientation and action are expected, by shortly enunciated principles by the future President, many times on his Twitter account, possibly having also the role of testing the public opinion. We have reasons to ask ourselves: should we expect new wars in the Middle East?

As in the US relationship with China we have also reasons to raise the question if “the Asian pivot” announced by Obama in 2011, will get not only a massive consistency, but if it will mean the development of a source for a geopolitical crisis with incalculable systemic consequences. Therefore, the expected short-term future is hazy, uncertain and full of sudden changes.





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